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The Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) mandates that the na-tion’s fuel supply contain at 
least 11.1 billion gallons of biofuels 
in 2009 and 12.9 billion gallons in 
2010. Of these volumes, biodiesel 
must make up at least 500 million 
gallons in 2009 and 650 million 
gallons in 2010. Other “advanced” 
biofuels must make up 100 million 
gallons in 2009 and 200 million gal-
lons in 2010. If the volumes of biodie-
sel and other advanced biofuels are 
exactly met, then the RFS mandates 
consumption of 10.5 and 12.0 billion 
gallons of conventional biofuels, the 
most important of which is domestic 
corn ethanol and Brazilian ethanol 
that is not used to meet the other 
advanced biofuels mandate. The 
corn and soybean lobbies, together 
with the biofuels industry, worked 
hard to get these mandates passed. 
The biofuels industry wanted 
guarantees that they would have a 
market for their product. Corn and 
soybean farmers wanted to lock in 
increased demand for their crops. 
An examination of the linkages 
between the RFS, energy prices, 
and crop prices shows how the RFS 
works in the interest of corn and 
soybean farmers by creating a fl oor 
under their commodity prices. 
Impact of the RFS on Biofuels 
and Crop Prices
Market forces could be used to 
determine ethanol and biodiesel 
prices. Fuel blenders use biofuels 
in their blends if the price is low 
enough to make it worth their while, 
and biofuels producers produce 
biofuels if the price is high enough 
to cover their costs. The market-
clearing price equalizes blenders’ 
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willingness to pay for another mil-
lion gallons of biofuels to the cost 
of producing the additional mil-
lion gallons. Existing tax credits 
and ethanol import tariffs serve to 
boost the demand for U.S. biofuels 
so the market-clearing price and 
quantity of biofuels is greater than 
if they did not exist. If the market-
clearing production of biofuels is 
greater than the RFS, then the RFS 
has no impact on production or 
price. However, market forces along 
with tax credits and tariffs may not 
stimulate enough biofuels produc-
tion to meet the RFS. This situation 
will occur if blenders’ willingness 
to pay for more biofuels is less than 
the cost of producing them. The 
gap between willingness to pay and 
production costs must be closed 
somehow if the RFS is to be met.
The gap can be closed by reduc-
ing production costs or by increas-
ing blenders’ willingness to pay. Pro-
duction costs could be decreased 
through outright subsidies. For 
example, the cost of corn to ethanol 
producers could be lowered through 
price subsidies. This would entail 
losses to taxpayers and gains to corn 
farmers. Or blenders’ purchases 
of biofuels could be directly subsi-
dized by increasing the blenders’ tax 
credit suffi ciently to increase their 
willingness to pay for biofuels. This 
alternative would also involve losses 
to taxpayers to the benefi t of blend-
ers and corn farmers. The alterna-
tive that was chosen by Congress 
was to specify how much biofuels 
must be used by each fuel refi ner, 
importer, and blender. If these enti-
ties choose to use less than their re-
quired amount, then they are free to 
buy credits from others who choose 
to use more than their required 
amount. Because each batch of bio-
fuels has a unique Renewable Identi-
fi cation Number (RIN) attached to it, 
it is easy to keep track of how much 
biofuels each entity is using. RINs 
are bought by those who fi nd it more 
profi table to buy credits rather than 
biofuels. RINs are sold by those who 
generate excess RINs by using more 
biofuels than required.
The supply of excess RINs is 
greater than the demand for RINs 
when the market-clearing quan-
tity of biofuels is greater than the 
RFS. For example, if consumption 
of biofuels is 12 billion gallons and 
the RFS is 10 billion gallons, then 
RINs that represent 2 billion gallons 
of biofuels have no use. The excess 
supply of RINS will drive their price 
down to almost zero. However, a 
shortage of RINs will occur if the 
market price of biofuels is such that 
blenders want to buy more RINs 
than biofuels. This shortage will 
cause the price of RINs to increase. 
An increase in the price of RINs will 
begin to increase the attractiveness 
of biofuels relative to RINs, thereby 
increasing the demand for ethanol. 
The price of RINs will keep rising 
until the demand for biofuels grows 
enough to bridge the gap between 
RINs are bought 
by those who fi nd it 
more profi table to buy 
credits rather than 
biofuels. RINs are sold 
by those who generate 
excess RINs by 
using more biofuels
 than required. 
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the willingness to pay for ethanol 
and the cost of producing ethanol. 
The RFS will be met when this gap 
is bridged. The market for RINs 
combined with the authority of the 
Environmental Protection Agency 
will ensure that the price of biofuels 
increases enough to cover the costs 
of producing enough biofuels to 
meet the RFS. 
The power of the market for RINs 
ensures that ethanol demand will 
generate high enough biofuel prices 
to allow biofuel plants to cover their 
production costs up to the RFS. In-
creased demand for biofuels trans-
lates directly into increased demand 
and higher prices for feedstocks. 
For example, Figure 1 shows that 
daily movements in nearby corn 
and ethanol prices on the Chicago 
Board of Trade are highly correlated, 
with a correlation coeffi cient of 0.97. 
This high correlation suggests that 
the ability of ethanol plants to pay 
for corn has largely determined the 
price of corn in the last year. If this 
relationship continues to hold, then 
any RFS-induced increase in the 
price of ethanol will result in higher 
corn prices. The market for RINs is 
the mechanism by which corn prices 
are supported by the RFS.
Outlook for Corn and 
Soybean Prices
The amount of corn acreage that will 
be needed in 2009 can be estimated 
using the latest USDA data, released 
on January 12. If food, feed, and ex-
ports remain at projected levels for 
the current marketing year, 11 billion 
gallons of corn ethanol are needed to 
meet the RFS, and 2009/10 carryout 
stocks are set at 1.5 billion bushels, 
then 12.1 billion bushels of corn will 
be needed from the 2009 crop. This 
will require approximately 86 mil-
lion acres to be planted at an average 
yield per planted acre of 140 bushels. 
To get 86 million acres of corn will 
require that a signifi cant number 
of corn acres be planted on acres 
that were planted to corn in 2008. 
Because yields typically drop when 
corn is planted after corn, and be-
cause it takes more nitrogen fertilizer 
and higher-priced seed to plant corn 
after corn, this level of acreage will 
not be planted unless market prices 
make it worthwhile for enough farm-
ers to plant corn after corn. 
Figure 2 shows the daily changes 
in the expected returns from plant-
ing an acre of corn this spring on 
ground that was planted to corn 
instead of planting an acre of soy-
beans. (See the accompanying ar-
ticle on page 10 for an explanation of 
this difference in returns.) As shown, 
there currently is no incentive for 
any farmer to plant corn after corn. 
If market prices stay where they 
are, then this lack of incentive to 
plant corn will mean that corn acre-
age will drop to perhaps 81 million 
acres. At 140 bushels per acre, this 
would result in production of 11.3 
billion bushels, which would mean a 
drawdown in stocks combined with 
a rationing of feed and export de-
mand with higher corn prices in the 
2009 marketing year. If the foregoing 
Figure 1. Indices of corn and ethanol prices (January 15, 2008 = 100)
Figure 2. Returns to planting corn after corn minus returns to planting 
soybeans after corn
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arithmetic is correct, and if market 
prices really do refl ect all available 
information, then prices will not 
stay where they are because current 
prices do not refl ect the potential 
for higher prices in 2009. Either the 
price of corn will need to be bid up 
or the price of soybeans will need to 
drop. Because of worries about the 
size of the South American soybean 
crop, future export demand for U.S. 
soybeans has also helped push soy-
bean prices higher. If South Ameri-
can yields turn out to be low, then it 
is unlikely that soybean prices would 
drop by much, which would push the 
price of corn higher. If South Ameri-
can yields turn out to be good and 
the world recession continues, the 
incentive to plant corn on corn could 
be increased if soybean prices drop 
more than corn prices.
RINs and Tax Credits
Because tax credits increase the 
demand for biofuels, they shrink or 
eliminate the gap between the will-
ingness to pay for biofuels and pro-
duction costs. If the gap is complete-
ly eliminated, then tax credits drive 
the price of RINs down to zero. If 
the gap is only partially eliminated, 
then the price of RINs is decreased 
by the amount of the tax credit. The 
current price of 2009 ethanol RINs is 
about 7¢ per gallon. The tax credit is 
45¢ per gallon. Thus, if the tax credit 
were eliminated, then the price of 
RINs would rise to approximately 
52¢ per gallon. 
This direct substitution between 
the price of RINs and the tax credit 
calls into question why both are 
needed. If the RFS is binding, then 
eliminating the tax credit would 
not change the demand for biofuels 
or the demand for corn and soy-
beans. Thus, the prices of biofuels, 
corn, and soybeans would all be 
unchanged. If the mandate is not 
binding then the tax credit provides 
support to biofuels and crops be-
yond that needed to meet the RFS, 
with resulting increases in feed and 
food costs. 
A straightforward alternative 
would be to eliminate the tax credit. 
Taxpayers would benefi t. Blenders 
and fuel users, on the other hand, 
would likely object to this change 
because rather than receiving a tax-
payer subsidy they would be taxed 
through higher RIN prices. However, 
one benefi t of this change would 
be that the cost of meeting the RFS 
would be fully and transparently 
refl ected in the value of RINs, thus 
leading to a more informed public 
debate about the costs and benefi ts 
of biofuels. ◆
